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Note
The Future of the US–EU Covered Agreement:
How to Drag an Absurdly Federalist Regulatory
System into the Global Reinsurance Marketplace
Bailey Stubbe
The US–EU Covered Agreement (“Covered Agreement”) is a
bilateral agreement between the United States (“US”) and the
European Union (“EU”) that puts in place regulations that will
govern the insurance and reinsurance industries in those
regions.1 This agreement represents an early step towards what
will likely become a more standardized and integrated approach
to international regulation of insurance markets. This note will
give the context and background necessary to understand the
Covered Agreement, explain the main provisions of the Covered
Agreement, analyze criticisms and next steps, and advocate for
a specific implementation of the Covered Agreement.
Section One explains how reinsurance functions. Section
Two is a discussion of traditional insurance market regulations
in the US and the EU followed by a comparison of the two
systems as they currently stand. Section Three gives a
background on covered agreements generally and how they
function. This section also introduces the key provisions of the
US–EU Covered Agreement and possible implementations of the
Covered Agreement. Finally, Section Four explores concerns
raised about the Covered Agreement, counters those concerns,
and provides a defense of the Covered Agreement as a beneficial
step forward for the EU and especially the US. Despite the issues
raised by some regulators and insurance companies, ultimately,
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1. Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and
Reinsurance, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY (Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.treasury.
gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-notices/Documents/Covered-Agreement-FactSheet-(011317)-FINAL.PDF.
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the substance of the Covered Agreement is fair and positive for
the US and should be implemented as soon as possible by the
individual states.
I. REINSURANCE: BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
The Covered Agreement mainly focuses on regulations for
reinsurance. Reinsurance is insurance purchased by insurance
companies (health, home, auto, life, disability, liability) against
the risk of claims that the insurers must pay.2 It is, essentially,
insurance for insurance companies. It represents an important
solvency management tool that almost all insurance companies
use. There are specific reinsurance companies, but many general
insurance companies have reinsurance departments and they all
reinsure each other’s claims.3 The insurance company buying
the reinsurance is known as the “cedent” or “ceding insurer.”4
Reinsurance serves multiple purposes. First, it limits a
cedent’s risk and losses (the reason individuals buy insurance).
The risk these companies are insuring against is that the
premiums they charge policyholders will be less than the claims
they must pay out on those policies.5 Having reinsurance also
increases the cedent’s underwriting capacity.6 Underwriting
capacity is the “maximum amount of loss exposure insured by
the insurer.” 7 Insurers can cover higher risk or higher value
policies when they know they have reinsurance protection.
Reinsurance also promotes a more efficient allocation of an
insurer’s capital.8 Much of an insurer’s capital comes from the
premiums they receive on policies. Insurers need to retain some
of those funds in reserve accounts, set aside to pay out claims as

2. NAIC REINSURANCE TASK FORCE OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION (E)
COMMITTEE, U.S. REINSURANCE COLLATERAL WHITE PAPER 4 (Mar. 5, 2006) (“A
ceding insurer transfers risk to an assuming reinsurer, the insurance company
that assumes all or part of the risk of one or more insurance policies issued by
the cedent.”).
3. See Top 50 Global Reinsurance Groups, REINSURANCE NEWS,
https://www.reinsurancene.ws/top-50-reinsurance-groups/.
4. Cedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
5. FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE BREADTH AND SCOPE
OF THE GLOBAL REINSURANCE MARKET AND THE CRITICAL ROLE SUCH MARKET
PLAYS IN SUPPORTING INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (Dec. 2014).
6. Id.
7. Underwriting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
8. NAIC, supra note 2, at 5.
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they arise.9 With reinsurance protection, insurers have the
flexibility to use more of the capital in the business instead of
saving it to pay out claims. Reinsurance is most useful for risks
with a low probability of occurrence, but a high cost if they do
occur.10
II.

INTRODUCTION TO TRADITIONAL
INSURANCE REGULATION

This section outlines the historical development of
insurance regulation in the US and EU systems as well as the
main differences between the two regulatory systems.
A. THE EU SYSTEM
The primary regulatory framework in the EU for insurance
and reinsurance is Solvency II.11 It primarily regulates solvency,
which, in the insurance sphere, is the ability of insurers to meet
their claim obligations to policyholders.12 Solvency II is a council
directive that came into effect in 2009.13 Before Solvency II, the
EU insurance and reinsurance markets were governed by
Solvency I, which was established in 1973.14 Solvency II
modernized insurance regulation by identifying additional risks
that were not captured under Solvency I, and by making
requirements more risk-sensitive. The Solvency II directive has
three main pillars. The first is a system of risk-based capital
requirements where insurance companies undergo risk profiles
and are thus required to maintain specific capital requirements
based on their determined level of risk.15 The second pillar is
market discipline, or governance and risk management
requirements.16 This provides for a transparent governance
9. Claims Reserve, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
claims-reserve.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
10. Examples of risks include natural disasters and other catastrophes.
INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, REINSURANCE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 19
(2012).
11. Council Directive 2009/138, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 335) (EC).
12. FED. INS. OFF., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, HOW TO
MODERNIZE AND IMPROVE THE SYSTEM OF INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 23 (Dec. 2013).
13. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 1.
14. Council Directive 73/239, art. 1, 1973 O.J. (EC).
15. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 28.
16. Id. at 34.
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system where insurance companies need to conduct regular
“Own Risk Solvency Assessments” (ORSAs).17 An ORSA is an
internal process where insurers self-assess their risk
management for all reasonably foreseeable risks (credit, market,
liquidity, underwriting, etc.) and analyze their present and
future solvency positions.18 The elements of an ORSA analysis
are: “(i) a description of the insurance or reinsurance group’s risk
management framework; (ii) an assessment of the insurance or
reinsurance group’s risk exposure; and (iii) a group assessment
of risk capital and a prospective solvency assessment.”19 The
third pillar of Solvency II is supervisory reporting and public
disclosure. Companies must make reports to the supervisory
authority body created in the Solvency II directive and make
regular disclosures to the public.20
B. THE US SYSTEM
The US insurance regulatory scheme is unique in the
international community. Insurance regulation in the US is left
mainly to the states, which leads to multiple—sometimes
conflicting—regulations, instead of one set of national
regulations with one national supervisory enforcement body,
which most countries have. 21 There exists some degree of
uniformity because of standard-setting and oversight by the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) but
control remains firmly in the hands of the states.22
The origins of state insurance regulation are strongly
shaped by two major cases and one important piece of
legislation. In 1868, the Supreme Court decided, in Paul v.
Virginia, that insurance is not commerce and therefore the
federal government cannot regulate it through its commerce
17. Id.
18. Own Risk Solvency Assessment, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (Apr.
9, 2018), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_own_risk_solvency_assessment
.htm.
19. Id.
20. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11, at 36.
21. David Zaring, It is time to Rethink Insurance Regulation, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/it-is-time-to-rethinkinsurance-regulation/ (“[T]he American system of insurance regulation, where
the federal role is minimal and each state has a different regulatory regime.”).
22. See State Insurance Regulation, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES.
(2011), https://www.naic.org/documents/topics_white_paper_hist_ins_reg.pdf
(explaining the function of the NAIC in state insurance regulation).
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clause power.23 The opinion stated that, “[i]ssuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”24 The reasoning
was that insurance policies are essentially local, personal
contracts of indemnity and are not interstate transactions, even
if the parties are in different states.25 It was not until 1944 that
the Supreme Court reversed this decision in the South Eastern
Underwriters Association (SEUA) case, and decided that
insurance is commerce that can be regulated by Congress.26 The
Supreme Court stated that even though insurance contracts
themselves are local in nature, they create a chain of events that
In reaction to the SEUA
becomes interstate commerce.27
case, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.
“Several Congressmen had reacted to the South-Eastern
Underwriters litigation . . . these congressman introduced
legislation that would have completely exempted the insurance
industry from antitrust laws . . . Senators McCarran and
Ferguson introduced an amended version of this proposal.”28
This Act contains a reverse preemption clause, which states that
“[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance.”29 This provision ensures
that federal laws that do not expressly regulate the “business of
insurance” will not preempt state insurance laws.30 Another
major piece of legislation which affects insurance regulation in
the US is the Dodd-Frank Act. Dodd-Frank created the Federal
Insurance Office (FIO) within the Department of the Treasury.31
The FIO was created to “monitor all aspects of the insurance
industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation
23. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1868).
24. Id. at 183.
25. Id.
26. United States v. S.E. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
27. Id. at 547.
28. Alan M. Anderson, Insurance and Antitrust Law: The McCarranFerguson Act and Beyond, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 85–86 (1983).
29. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C, §§ 1011–1015 (1945).
30. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 90 (“[The] three-prong test for
determining whether an insurer’s activity is within the business of insurance:
the first prong examines whether the activity involves the underwriting or
spreading of risk; the second prong focuses on whether the activity involves the
insurer-insured relationship; and the third prong, as refined in Pireno, asks
whether the activity is limited to entities within the insurance industry, thus
conforming to the legislative intent of the Act.”).
31. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R.
4173; P.L. 111–203 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank”).
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of insurers that could contribute to a systemic crisis in the
insurance industry or the US financial system.”32 Importantly,
this body monitors but does not regulate.33 The FIO does not
have the power to enforce regulations on insurance companies
apart from requiring disclosure and access for the purpose of
monitoring.34
State solvency regulation is largely coordinated by the
NAIC.35 This group of state insurance commissioners creates
model laws and regulations that state legislatures can choose to
adopt.36 These model rules pertain to all aspects of insurance
regulation, but the most widely adopted are the solvency rules,
which are almost unanimously codified by the states.37 These
solvency rules are so widely adopted because of the NAIC’s
regulation equivalency system for solvency regulation.38 States
that participate in the program and adopt the NAIC’s model
solvency laws only need to be regulated by their home state
authority, and do not need to be regulated by every state they do
business in because the participating states’ insurance
regulatory programs are considered to be equivalent.39 Like
Solvency II in the EU, the NAIC solvency regulations require
insurers to perform regular ORSA’s to self-analyze their
solvency and risk levels.40

32. Id. § 313.
33. Federal Insurance Office (FIO), NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (July
13, 2018), https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_fio.htm (“FIO does not have
supervisory or regulatory authority over the business of insurance.”).
34. See About FIO, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (JUNE 12, 2013),
treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/about-fio (“In addition to advising the Secretary of
the Treasury [] on major domestic and prudential international insurance
policy . . . FIO is specifically authorized to: monitor all aspects of the insurance
industry, including identifying issues or gaps in the regulation of insurers that
could contribute to a systemic crisis in the insurance industry or the U.S.
financial system.”).
35. See About the NAIC, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES.,
https://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2018) (describing
the functions of the NAIC).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. See State Insurance Regulation, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining the
NAIC’s solvency equivalency system); NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND
GUIDELINES § III-390 (1999) at 3.
39. See NAIC MODEL LAWS § III-390, supra note 38.
40. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES § III-505 2012).
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C. COMPARISON OF THE US AND EU INSURANCE
REGULATORY SYSTEMS
The main difference between EU and US insurance
regulation is that in the US there is relatively little regulation
of insurance on the national level. Most regulation is done by the
states, which can lead to international insurers following
multiple regulations if they wish to operate in the US.41 Another
challenge for the US is that it brings so many people to the
international insurance negotiating table. State insurance
regulators want to be present because they are the ones that
make the regulations.42 The NAIC wants to be included as a
representative of the states.43 The leaders of FIO also want to be
present as the national insurance supervisors.44 These
competing interests can make international negotiations more
difficult.
Both the EU and the US have implemented ORSA
procedures and graduated capital requirements where
companies evaluated to have higher risk levels are required to
hold more capital to ensure that they can adequately pay their
claims.45
III.

INTRODUCTION TO THE US–EU COVERED
AGREEMENT

A. COVERED AGREEMENTS GENERALLY
The notion of a covered agreement was first included in
Dodd-Frank.46 It creates the authority for the Treasury
Department and the US Trade Representative (USTR) to
41. See Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and
the United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and
Reinsurance, supra note 1 (“In the United States, state insurance regulators
have general authority over the business of insurance (including reinsurance)”).
42. See State Insurance Regulation, supra note 22, at 2 (“State legislatures
are the public policymakers that establish set broad policy for the regulation of
insurance”).
43. See About the NAIC, supra note 35.
44. See About FIO, supra note 34.
45. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11; OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY
ASSESSMENT (ORSA) (E) SUBGROUP OF THE FINANCIAL CONDITION (E)
COMMITTEE, NAIC OWN RISK AND SOLVENCY ASSESSMENT (ORSA) GUIDANCE
MANUAL (July 2014).
46. Dodd-Frank, supra note 31 at §531
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address areas where state insurance laws treat US insurers
differently than non-US insurers.47
1.

The Process for Entering into a Covered
Agreement

The USTR and FIO negotiate the covered agreement
jointly.48 Throughout the process they consult several
congressional committees and update the committees on the
nature of the agreement, how it will achieve the purpose of the
Dodd-Frank Act, and how the eventual implementation of the
covered agreement will affect state laws.49 Before the agreement
can go into effect it must be submitted to the House Financial
Services Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, the
Senate Banking Committee, and the Senate Finance
Committee.50 There is then a ninety-day waiting period after
which the agreement can enter into force.51
2.

Covered Agreement Preemption

Under Dodd-Frank, covered agreements “can serve as a
basis for preemption of a state law under certain circumstances
if the agreement relates to measures substantially equivalent to
the protections afforded consumers under state law.”52 This
means current state laws that have collateral requirements for
EU reinsurance companies could be invalidated if the FIO
Director determines that they are inconsistent with the Covered
Agreement.53 A covered agreement will serve to overcome the
reverse preemption clause in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
requiring that the states follow the rules of the Covered
Agreement as long as those rules afford consumers the same
protections they would get under state law.54

47. Key Issue: The National System of State Regulation and Covered
Agreement, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y & RES. (July. 10, 2018),
https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_covered_agreement.htm.
48. Id.
49. NAIC GOV’T REL., COVERED AGREEMENT ON REINSURANCE CONSUMER
PROTECTION COLLATERAL at 2 (2016).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2 (describing the effects of the Covered Agreement on the states).
54. Id.
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B. KEY PROVISIONS OF THE COVERED AGREEMENT
The US–EU Covered Agreement has three main focuses for
international prudential insurance regulation: reinsurance,
group supervision, and free exchange of information between
insurance supervisors.55
1. Reinsurance
The Covered Agreement provisions related to reinsurance
are centered on the elimination of capital requirements that the
US currently imposes on EU reinsurers.56 Foreign reinsurance
companies that operated in the US historically were required to
hold 100% collateral for risks assumed from US insurers.57 This
was done to make sure the reinsurance companies had enough
capital to pay any claims that arose. Because of the way
reinsurance works, the occasions when reinsurance companies
have to pay out claims tend to be less predictable, large-scale
events, like natural disasters. Therefore, it is especially
important for reinsurance companies to be sufficiently
capitalized to pay claims.58 However, a 100% collateral
requirement forces reinsurance companies to hold a substantial
amount of capital on their books that is unavailable for investing
or other purposes.59
Under the US–EU Covered Agreement, US and EU
regulatory bodies can no longer hold collateral requirements, or
other requirements with the same effect. Neither party is
allowed to
(a) maintain or adopt any requirement to post collateral
in connection with cessions from a Host Party Ceding
Insurer to a Home Party Assuming Reinsurer and any
related reporting requirement attributable to such

55. Bilateral Agreement Between the United States of America and the
European Union on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and
Reinsurance, art. 5–8, Eur. Union-U.S., Sept. 22, 2017, T.I.A.S. 18-0404
[hereinafter US-EU Covered Agreement].
56. Fact Sheet: Bilateral Agreement between the European Union and the
United States of America on Prudential Measures Regarding Insurance and
Reinsurance, supra note 1.
57. NAIC GOV’T REL., supra note 49, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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removed collateral, or (b) maintain or adopt any new
requirement with substantially the same regulatory
impact on the Home Party Assuming Reinsurer as
collateral requirements removed under this Agreement
or any reporting requirement attributable to such
removed collateral.60

Because ending collateral requirements removes a level of
assurance that claims will be paid, the Covered Agreement
implements new group supervision requirements. The idea is
that if the solvency regulation is accurate, consumers will know
that reinsurance companies are able to pay out their claims, so
there will be no need for high collateral requirements.
2. Group Supervision
Under the group supervision provisions, US insurers are
relieved from following the requirements of Solvency II and its
corresponding supervisory authorities as long as the US follows
group capital assessment requirements, which capture the risk
of parent companies instead of their individual subsidiary
entities.61 As defined in the Covered Agreement, group
supervision means “the application of regulatory and prudential
oversight by a supervisory authority to an insurance or
reinsurance group for purposes including protecting
policyholders and other consumers, and promoting financial
stability and global engagement.”62 Essentially group
supervision is the idea that insurance companies need to be
monitored at the “group” or parent-company level rather than
monitoring the individual subsidiaries of the insurance or
reinsurance company as separate entities.63
Another important provision of Article Four on group
supervision is the idea of Home supervisory authorities versus
Host supervisory authorities.64 Before the Covered Agreement
took place, an insurer that had branches in the US and the EU

60. US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 4.
61. See id. (detailing group supervision requirements).
62. Id. at 6.
63. Daniel Schwarcz, A Critical Take on Group Regulation of Insurers in
the United States, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 537, 541 (2015).
64. See US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 18 (describing the
new Home/Host supervisory requirements).

2019]

US–EU COVERED AGREEMENT

227

would be regulated by both the US and the EU.65 The regulations
varied and the supervisory authorities in each jurisdiction had
different procedures and requested different documents.66
Under the Covered Agreement, a US company with branches in
the EU will only need to be regulated by the US, and an EU
company with branches in the US will only need to be regulated
by the EU. So, insurance companies will only need to report to
the supervisory authority in their Home country and not in the
Host country of their subsidiary. This is essentially a large-scale
version of the NAIC’s state solvency equivalency program where
insurance companies only need to be regulated in their home
states because all the states are operating under the same
regulations.67
However, allowing insurance companies to report solely to
their Home authority only works if the regulatory schemes of the
US and the EU are deemed to be equivalent.68 While the Covered
Agreement does reference using “equivalent documentation”
under the group supervision requirements, the Covered
Agreement does not explicitly state that the regulatory schemes
are actually equivalent.69 Currently under Solvency II, EU
insurance regulation is done at the group level.70 The US
ostensibly started monitoring on the group level in 1969, but the
weaknesses in their approach were made apparent after the
2007–2008 financial crisis.71 The US approach to monitoring and
supervision has been described as a “windows and walls”
system.72 There are walls between the insurance subsidiaries of
a large parent company to protect the individual insurer’s
capital, but there are windows in those protective walls so

65. Eur. Ins. & Occupational Pensions Auth., Guidelines on the supervision
of branches of third-country insurance undertakings, EIOPA-BoS-15/110 (Oct.
23, 2010).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 19 (“Where no such
worldwide group ORSA is applied to a Home Party insurance or reinsurance
group, according to applicable law, the relevant US State or EU Member State’s
supervisory authority provides equivalent documentation which is prepared
consistent with applicable law of the Home supervisory authority . . . .”).
70. Council Directive 2009/138, supra note 11.
71. Kris DeFrain, Insurance Group Supervision, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. POL’Y
& RES. (Apr. 2012), https://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3_ins_
group_supervision.htm.
72. Id.
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insurance regulators can monitor the group as a whole.73 In the
years leading up to 2007, the windows at American
International Group, Inc. (“AIG”) must have been dirtied
because regulators were slow to see the danger in AIG’s tangled
subsidiaries. Problems arose because “AIG Investments loaned
securities from the investment portfolios of AIG’s insurance
companies to various financial institutions in exchange for cash
collateral posted by the borrower. AIG Investments would then
invest the collateral in debt securities to earn a return which
would serve as compensation for lending securities.”74
Because of this failure, the NAIC amended Model Laws
#440 and #450.75 The new model laws give state regulators
expanded ability to monitor holding companies that pose a risk
to the insurance branch of that company.76 They also give
regulators greater access to the records of the parent company.77
The US has made strides towards more comprehensive group
supervision. Most states have adopted at least part of the
Insurance Holding Company model regulation.78 But in order to
eventually be considered equivalent the US must develop a
“Worldwide Group Capital Calculation.”79 A worldwide group
capital calculation needs to capture the risk level of the entire
group, which includes the parent undertaking of the insurance
or reinsurance company.80 This risk analysis system emphasizes
monitoring all subsidiaries and arms of a group in every country
that they operate in in order to get a more accurate picture of
their true risk profile.81 After the Covered Agreement was
signed, the NAIC formed a Group Capital Calculation working
group to develop their own group capital methodology.82 The
working group met with the Federal Reserve Board on February
12th, 2018 to discuss the construction of this calculation.83

73. Id.
74. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943,
961 (2009).
75. DeFrain, supra note 71.
76. Id.
77. NAIC MODEL LAWS, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES § III-450 (2011).
78. Id.
79. See US–EU Covered Agreement supra note 55, at 21 (describing the
worldwide group capital calculation).
80. Id. at 19.
81. See id. at 8 (explaining the new risk analysis system).
82. Group
Capital
Calculation
(E)
Working
Group,
NAIC,
https://www.naic.org/cmte _e_grp_capital_wg.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2018).
83. Id.
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3. Open Exchange of Information
The goal for the open exchange of information between
insurance supervisors is a non-binding encouragement for
insurance supervisors in the US and EU to share information.
The Covered Agreement includes model provisions for
information exchange that the insurance supervisors are
encouraged to adopt.84 Article Five of the Covered Agreement is
more of a brief goal statement than the other two clear directives
in the Covered Agreement: The Parties shall encourage
supervisory authorities in their respective jurisdictions to
cooperate in exchanging information pursuant to the practices
set forth in the Annex. The Parties understand that the use of
such practices will enhance cooperation and information
sharing, while respecting a high standard of confidentiality
protection.85 More specific information exchange practices will
likely be developed as the US and the EU begin the process of
implementing the rest of the Covered Agreement.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KEY PROVISIONS
EU member states have twenty-four months from the
signing of the Covered Agreement to eliminate local presence
requirements and US companies that have not yet established
branches in the EU do not have to do so.86 The US needs to start
a preemption determination under Dodd-Frank within forty-two
months of the signing of the Covered Agreement (and complete
it within sixty months of signing) to find out whether the
Covered Agreement preempts the laws of any states by treating
EU insurers less favorably than US insurers.87 Because the
individual states regulate collateral requirements, each state
will need to individually decrease their current collateral
requirements. Collateral requirements for EU reinsurers need
to be decreased by at least 20% each year until the collateral
holding requirement reaches 0%.88
Group supervision implementation will start with a sixty84.
85.
86.
2017),
xt.pdf.
87.
88.

See About FIO, supra note 1 (discussing the new model provisions).
US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 24.
EU/U.S. Covered Agreement: What’s Next?, HOGAN LOVELLS 9 (Feb.
hlinsurancelaw.com/files/2017/02/EU-US-Covered-Agreement-What-Ne
US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 29.
Id. at 28.
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month period where EU supervisory authorities will not impose
worldwide group capital requirements on the US 89 Currently,
US regulations do not comply with worldwide group capital
calculations.90 During that period, the US is to “provisionally
apply” those requirements using “best efforts” and “encouraging”
the insurance regulation authorities of the individual states to
follow the requirements.91
IV.

LOOKING AHEAD: POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
AND WHY THE COVERED AGREEMENT IS
POSITIVE DESPITE TED NICKEL’S
OBJECTIONS

A. FUTURE PLANS
The Covered Agreement was signed in September 2017 and
the US and the EU are both in the process of determining the
best way to implement it.92 The NAIC is currently going through
a notice and comment period, and they held a meeting of the
newly created Reinsurance Task Force on February 20, 2018 to
discuss potential implementations.93 The NAIC Insurance Task
Force took comments from state regulators and domestic
insurance and reinsurance companies. The NAIC requested
comments on amending NAIC Model Law #785 and Model
Regulation #786, which will determine how best to eliminate the
reinsurance collateral requirements for EU reinsurers as
required by the Covered Agreement.94
The Task Force also took comments about changing the
criteria to allow countries to become “qualified jurisdictions” and
allowing those qualified jurisdictions to have equivalent
reinsurance collateral requirements to those the EU now has.95
The Task Force is also considering extending the same EU

89. Id. at 29–30 (“Except as otherwise specified, this Agreement shall apply
on the date of the entry into force, or 60 months from the date of signature of
this Agreement, whichever is later.”).
90. Group Capital Calculation (E) Working Group, supra note 82.
91. US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 30.
92. About FIO, supra note 1.
93. Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments, NAIC (Dec. 21,
2017), https://naic.org/documents/cmte_e_reinsurance_related_180220_public
_hearing_notice.pdf.
94. Id.
95. See id. (describing the comments the Task Force solicited).
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collateral and group supervision requirements to other countries
that the US may enter into a future covered agreement with. 96
The Task Force wants comments to inform its decision on
whether the US should give non-EU countries a similar deal to
the Covered Agreement and how to determine which countries
should get those arrangements. The Task Force also requested
comments on what safety precautions to implement to address
solvency risks now that the old solvency precaution (collateral
requirements) will be eliminated.97 At the hearing, the Task
Force also asked for comments on any other considerations about
the implementation of the Covered Agreement brought up by the
state insurance regulatory bodies and industry players.98
In late February of 2018 the NAIC released an update on
the note and comment process and published the comments they
received.99 Twenty entities submitted written comments on the
agreement in a wide variety of areas.100 Some, like the American
Insurance Association, proposed specific suggestions for
implementation.101 Other groups, like the Allstate Corporation
voiced their concerns about the effect of the agreement.102
Pleasingly, many of the implementations suggested in the
comments are similar to the implementation advocated for by
this note.
B. POTENTIAL CONCERNS
When the Covered Agreement was first announced in
January 2017, the initial reaction among the affected insurance
companies and state regulatory bodies was concern about the
potential uncertainties that the Covered Agreement created.103

96. Id.
97. See id. (listing the comments the Task Force requested during the
notice and comment period).
98. Id.
99. Roland C. Gross, The NAIC Moves to Implement the Covered Agreement,
19,
2018).),
1,
CARLTON FIELDS: REINSURANCE FOCUS (Mar.
https://reinsurancefocus.com/data/20/1/142/136/1957625/user/2137514/htdocs/b
log/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Special-Focus-The-NAIC-Moves-to-Implement
-the-Covered-Agreement-3.19.18.pdf.
100. Id. at 1–2.
101. Comment Letters: Covered Agreement Public Hearing Held on February
20, 2018, NAIC (Mar. 2018), https://www.naic.org/documents/cmte_e_
reinsurance_related_180220_public_hearing_comment_letters.pdf.
102. Id.
103. US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 2.
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The state regulators were unsure about their roles in the
implementation of the Covered Agreement.104 The Dodd-Frank
preemption determination has a long timeframe and loose
guidelines for implementation.105 It was unclear early on if
states should act quickly to avoid potential preemption or if they
should wait and then challenge any unfavorable preemption
decisions in court.106
When the Covered Agreement was signed in September
2017, the US and the EU issued a joint statement and each
issued their own individual statements to clarify the
implementation of the Covered Agreement.107 Once the
regulatory groups and insurance companies received the text of
the Covered Agreement and the clarifying fact sheets, some
decided that the Covered Agreement would provide increased
clarity and stability and would not be as harmful as they initially
feared. 108 There are however, still some large concerns currently
left unresolved. One main concern of state regulatory bodies and
the NAIC is that currently having no collateral requirements for
reinsurance companies removes an important protection for
consumers and could be potentially harmful for policyholders.109
The NAIC’s other main concern is that their state laws will be
preempted by the Covered Agreement.110 The NAIC is made up
of state insurance commissioners and regulators and a finding
of preemption here would carve away some of their regulatory
power and set a precedent to carve away even more if the USTR
enters into any future covered agreements. The NAIC voiced
their concerns in a response brief to the announcement of the
Covered Agreement:
The federal government has not demonstrated benefits
to US insurers or consumers that would warrant a
covered agreement preempting state law. There are
alternatives to such drastic action, including state action
already underway. However, if Treasury and USTR
move forward, state insurance regulators expect to be a

104. See id. (stating the NAIC’s concerns regarding the Covered Agreement).
105. Dodd-Frank, supra note 31 at § 502.
106. Id.
107. US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 2–3 (stating the joint
understanding of the agreement).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. NAIC GOV’T REL., supra note 49, at 4.
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direct part of the negotiations to ensure that mutual
recognition is not paid for with unnecessary preemption
of state law.111
C. TED NICKEL: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
One of the leading voices against the Covered Agreement
was former NAIC president, Ted Nickel. The NAIC elects officers
from their members for one-year terms.112 Ted Nickel, Wisconsin
Commissioner of Insurance appointed by Governor Scott
Walker, was president of the NAIC in 2017, so the USTR was in
the process of negotiation and developing the Covered
Agreement during his tenure.113 Nickel laid out his problems
with the Covered Agreement in his policy setting newsletter
“The Year Before Us: Perspectives from NAIC President Ted
Nickel.”114 Nickel’s newsletter is a helpful framework for
analyzing objections to the Covered Agreement because it
outlines some of the most common concerns. One of Nickel’s
main concerns is that the Covered Agreement treats US
reinsurance companies operating in the EU unfairly. In the
newsletter he writes:
Fellow regulators and I are concerned with the disparate
treatment some EU jurisdictions are imposing on US
insurers. State insurance regulators are committed to
reaching accord on a system of mutual recognition
without any jurisdiction imposing its values and
regulatory systems on another. Both US and EU insurers
deserve to receive fair and equal treatment. There should
be no disadvantage to an EU insurer doing business in
the US Similarly, a US insurer should not be
disadvantaged when it operates in the EU.115
This worry of disparate treatment is unfounded. EU

111. Id.
112. Bylaws of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, art. 3,
NAIC (Dec. 2015), https://www.naic.org/documents/members_bylaws.pdf?90.
113. 2018
Executive
(Ex)
Committee,
1,
NAIC
(2018),
https://www.naic.org/documents/members_cmtelist_exec.pdf?38.
114. Ted Nickel, The Year Before Us: Perspectives From NAIC President Ted
Nickel, 2, NAIC CTR. FOR INS. & POL’Y RES. (Mar. 2017),
https://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol21_real.pdf.
115. Id.
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regulators can and do treat US insurance companies differently
than they treat EU insurance companies without the Covered
Agreement. The Covered Agreement will actually end this
disparate treatment through the new group supervision
requirements.116 Article Four of the Covered Agreement states
that the “Home Party insurance or reinsurance group is subject
only to . . . its Home supervisory authorities, and is not subject
to . . . any Host supervisory authority.”117 Under the Covered
Agreement, EU regulators will not be able to treat US insurance
and reinsurance companies unfairly because those companies
will not actually be subject to EU requirements. One of the few
regulatory powers the host country will have once the Covered
Agreement fully enters into force is the ability to request and
obtain information from an insurer or reinsurer in its territory
for the purpose of prudential insurance regulation and the
Covered Agreement encourages host territories to avoid
burdensome or duplicative requests.118 However, the Covered
Agreement encourages Host territories to avoid burdensome or
duplicative requests whenever possible.
Nickel’s next concern, that the EU will impose its “value and
regulatory system” on US insurance and reinsurance companies,
is similarly misguided. The only specific regulation guidelines in
the Covered Agreement are the worldwide group ORSA
guidelines, which both the US and the EU already followed.119
There is a provision in Article Four that allows the Host
supervisory authority (the EU in Nickel’s fears) to impose
“preventive, corrective, or otherwise responsive measures” on a
foreign reinsurer if they find that the worldwide group ORSA
indicates that the insurance or reinsurance company “exposes
any serious threat to policyholder protection or financial
stability in the territory of the Host supervisory authority.”120
However, before they can implement any of those measures, the
Host supervisory authority needs to consult with that company’s
Home supervisory authority.121 There is always a chance that
the EU could impose harsh measures against US insurance
companies despite consultation from their Home supervisory
authority in the US. This outcome seems unlikely because a
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 18.
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party is no longer bound by their limitations under the
agreement when the other party does not follow their limitations
under the agreement.122
A worry cited by Nickel and other stakeholders is that the
Covered Agreement “needs to better protect US consumers,
insurers, and the state‐based insurance regulatory system. Our
system has a long track record of protecting insurance
consumers and promoting competitive insurance markets.”123
However, Nickel believes the US should eliminate the FIO
(created to protect consumers through regulatory oversight),
give states a voice in monitoring risk, and let the Treasury
Department deal with any leftover federal coordination that
needs to be done, so his views on consumer protection in
insurance are slightly outside the norm.124
The standards of protection ensured by the Covered
Agreement make up for the consumer protections it removes.125
While it eliminates reinsurance collateral requirements that
protect insurance companies and requires the US to give up
some regulatory power over European insurance companies
operating in the US,126 the Covered Agreement sets forth
standards for companies that will eventually hold zero
collateral. The reinsurers must have at least $250 million (€226
million) in capital and surplus.127 They must also have a “ratio
of 100% SCR (solvency capital requirement) under Solvency II
or an RBC (risk-based capital) of 300%, which means the
companies hold $3 in capital for every $1 in risk assumed.128 The
reinsurance companies will also have to consent to the
jurisdiction of the Host supervisory authority and service of
process in the Host country, and to agree to pay any final

122. U.S. and European Regulators Conclude Covered Agreement
Negotiations, 2, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP (Jan. 16, 2017),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_SC_Publicati
on_U.S._and_European_Regulators_Conclude_Covered_Agreement_Negotiatio
ns.pdf.
123. Nickel, supra note 114. at 2.
124. Id. at 2–3.
125. See US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 1.
126. See id. at 9 (explaining the reduction of collateral requirements and
changing Home/Host regulations).
127. Id. at 11–12.
128. Id. at 12; Annual Conference: Risk-Based Capital, CRE FINANCE
COUNCIL (June 11–13, 2012), http://www.crefc.org/uploadedFiles/CMSA_
Site_Home/Events/Major_Conferences/CMSA-Annual_Convention/2012/Wher
es_the_MEAF.pdf.
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judgments or enforcements sought by a ceding insurer.129 These
standards are safeguards that provide essentially the same level
of protection as collateral requirements and add an enforcement
mechanism is triggered if the standards are not met, which
actually gives consumers an extra level of protection.130 Because
the Covered Agreement makes it so insurance and reinsurance
companies do not need to be regulated by their host countries,
there is a potential that consumers could lose regulatory
protection from EU insurers operating in the US. But again, the
Covered Agreement contemplates this danger.
C. WHAT THE STATES SHOULD DO
The states have two options for what to do about the
Covered Agreement. One, they can leave their laws the same and
wait for FIO to make a preemption determination, invalidate
their foreign reinsurance collateral laws, and host presence
supervisory authority laws for running counter to the Covered
Agreement.131 Or, two, the states can act quickly to get ahead of
the future preemption determination. The NAIC was in the
process of reworking their reinsurance collateral model laws
when the Covered Agreement was signed.132 By April 2016,
thirty-two states had passed legislation to implement these
model laws, which allow certified reinsurers to post less than
100% collateral.133 The NAIC developed a peer review system to
certify foreign reinsurance oversight systems and a few
countries within the EU have already been certified.134 The
NAIC is likely capable of certifying the rest of the EU countries
individually if they desired.
Unlike the provisions in the Covered Agreement, the NAIC
model law does not reduce collateral by a percentage and does
not automatically decrease over time.135 Instead it gives certified
reinsurers credit that they can use to do several things,
including potentially decreasing required collateral.136 The
NAIC can address this discrepancy in a number of ways. The
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55. at 13.
See id. (describing remedies for violations of the Covered Agreement).
See NAIC GOV’T REL., supra note 49, at 3–4.
See id. at 1.
Id.
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cleanest option would be to create a new model law that mirrors
the language of Article Three in the Covered Agreement.
Reinsurance collateral requirements would be reduced by 20%
each year for countries in the EU.137 This regulation would have
to be coordinated with Model Law #785 so that EU countries that
have a better collateral rate under Model Law #785 do not have
their percentages raised in the interim.138 The “qualified
jurisdiction” requirements from Model Law #785 align with the
requirements in the Covered Agreement in a lot of places so it
will not be too much of an adjustment for reinsurers following
those laws. Where they do not align, the requirements in Model
Law #785 are generally a lower standard than those set forth in
the Covered Agreement which makes the adjustment to this new
model law less likely to raise concerns about consumer
protection standards.139
If the NAIC and the states implement laws in accordance
with the Covered Agreement, they avoid going through lengthy
preemption challenge litigation, avoid setting any precedents for
preemption (since it has never happened before), and have more
power in how the Covered Agreement will be implemented. All
of these things are absolutely in the best interests of the states,
so the NAIC and the states should act quickly to write new model
laws for the states to adopt.
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 6, 2018, the Reinsurance Task Force met to
discuss proposed revisions for Model Law #785 and Model
Regulation #786.140 The proposed revision for Model Law #785
alters the “reciprocal jurisdiction” language to include
jurisdictions that have “entered into a treaty or international
agreement with the US regarding credit for reinsurance.”141 It
also includes language providing that state insurance
commissioners can establish other requirements for reinsurers

137. US-EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, at 28.
138. See NAIC MODEL LAW § 785.
139. Compare US–EU Covered Agreement, supra note 55, with NAIC
MODEL LAW § 785.
140. 2018 Summer National Meeting, Reinsurance (E) Task Force Monday,
August 6, 2018, NAIC (July 19, 2018), https://www.naic.org/meetings1808/
cmte_e_reinsurance_2018_summer_nm_agenda.pdf.
141. NAIC MODEL LAW § 785(F)(1)(a)(i) (NAIC, Tentative Draft June 21,
2018).
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in the newly reciprocal jurisdictions, but if reinsurers do not
comply, it “will not alter the ability of the ceding insurer to take
credit for such reinsurance” so this part of the provision likely
would not have a large effect on reinsurers.142 The proposed
revisions to Model Regulation #786 essentially incorporate the
standards and requirements set forth in the Covered Agreement
for reinsurers that will hold zero percent collateral.143 The NAIC
finished its comment period for the proposed revisions on July
23, 2018 and may adjust the revisions depending on the
comments.144 After any post-comment adjustments, NAIC will
formally promulgate the updated model laws and individual
states will then decide whether to adopt them.
V. CONCLUSION
Signing on to the Covered Agreement was a meaningful
initial step into the global insurance and reinsurance
marketplace for the US. Because insurance regulation seems to
be following financial regulation in becoming more globally
cohesive, it is important that the US participates so it has a say
in forming policy and does not get left behind. Aligning US
insurance regulatory policy with EU insurance regulatory policy
is more complicated and labor intensive than it would be for
other countries because of the United States’ unique federalist
system, in which the individual states can set their own
regulatory policy that can govern international deals. Despite
concerns raised by the NAIC and state insurance regulators, the
Covered Agreement will be positive for the US, because it
provides equivalent protections for consumers and insurers and
builds on the strides the US has made toward a worldwide group
supervisory system. There is a lot yet to be decided as the states
move towards implementation, but it is in the states’ best
interest to embrace the agreement and take a leading role in the
implementation process. This Covered Agreement will have
many future benefits for insurers and consumers in the US and
the EU.
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